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After decades of fertility postponement, we investigate recent changes in late parent-
hood across low-fertility countries in the light of observations from the past. We use
long series of age-specific fertility rates from the Human Fertility Database (1950–
2016) for women, and new data covering the period 1990–2016 for men. In 1950,
the contribution of births at age 40 and over to female fertility rates ranged from
2.5 to 9 percent, but then fell sharply until the 1980s. From the 1990s, however, the
prevalence of late first births increased rapidly, especially so in countries where it was
initially lowest. This has produced a late fertility rebound in the last two decades, oc-
curring much faster for women than for men. Comparisons between recent and past
extremely late (age 48+) fertility levels confirm that people are now challenging the
natural fertility barriers, particularly for a first child.
Introduction
Age at childbearing continues to rise across the low-fertility countries. In
2016, mean age at first birth was often reaching 28–30 years for women,
with Italy having the highest at 31 years (Sobotka et al. 2018). In the
early 1970s, first births occurred before age 25 on average in all European
countries and the United States, so this increase is considerable (Neels
et al. 2017). Biological factors are never, and cultural factors not always,
favorable to childbearing at older ages. Rising levels of fertility at less fertile
ages go hand in hand with increasing number of unsuccessful attempts to
have children at late ages: Research has drawn attention to the psycho-
logical distress experienced by men and women who do not succeed in
having children they desire, particularly a first child (McQuillan et al. 2003;
Wischmann and Thorn 2013). Nonetheless, increasing shares of women are
having children in their 40s and beyond (Prioux 2005; Billari et al. 2007a;
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Beaujouan and Sobotka 2019). It is thus important to establish a complete
picture of late fertility trends in the low-fertility countries, and of its varia-
tions across different contexts, to allow researchers to reflect on this change
in a long-term perspective and to better assess its extent and potential
repercussions.
In the early 1950s in Europe, the United States, and Japan, large fam-
ilies were very common (Sardon 1992; Van Bavel et al. 2018). At that time,
“late” parenthood was by no means unusual, consisting mostly of high or-
der births (Prioux 2005; Beaujouan and Sobotka 2019). The years of rapid
economic development after World War II were an exceptional period in
the modern history of the family (Coontz 2006; Hareven 2010). A growing
share of the population adopted early marriage, with women’s age at first
marriage falling to a record low in the 1950s in the United States and Japan
and in the 1970s in Europe (Sardon 1992). Adherence to family norms grad-
ually strengthened, with two-child families becoming very common (Brzo-
zowska, Beaujouan, and Zeman 2017) and late fertility more exceptional
(Billari et al. 2007a; Beaujouan and Sobotka 2019).
The change in individual values from the early 1970s, brought about
by the Second Demographic Transition (SDT), women’s increased labor
market participation, their rising levels of education, and the availability of
effective contraception led to a general postponement of family formation
and first births (van de Kaa 1987; Nicoletti and Tanturri 2008; Lesthaeghe
2010; Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2012; Neels et al. 2017). With the rise
in economic uncertainty in the last quarter of the twentieth century, it also
took longer for couples to achieve sufficient financial stability to raise a fam-
ily (Kreyenfeld, Andersson, and Pailhé 2012). In today’s society, it is now so-
cially acceptable and, often, economically necessary, to start a family much
later than in the 1970s, and this has resulted in a sharp rise in late first
and second births, and in overall late fertility over recent decades (see, e.g.,
Billari et al. 2007a).
The age at which one becomes a “late” mother or father cannot be
defined without reference to a period and a country (Moguérou et al.
2011). The definition of late childbearing is subjective and is embedded in
the fertility levels and norms prevailing across time and space. However,
from age 40, childbearing events become rarer among women, making that
age a good threshold for empirical study (Billari et al. 2007a; Beaujouan
and Sobotka 2019); women’s age-related physiological inability to have
children increases exponentially from age 35, and by age 40 more than
one third of women are generally estimated to be permanently sterile
(Leridon 2008). Across all European countries in 2006, women above
40 were commonly perceived to be too old to consider having any more
children (Billari et al. 2011). Age 48, for its part, is a good threshold for
extremely late childbearing among women, as natural births beyond that
age are exceptionally rare (te Velde and Pearson 2002; Leridon 2008). In
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Sweden, for example, first birth rates at that age did not rise to a visible
level until the late 1990s (Billari et al. 2007a, Figure 3). With the use of
assisted reproductive technologies (ART), conditional birth rates at age
48 and above increase visibly beyond the “chance occurrences” observed
in natural conception (Billari et al. 2007a, 163–64). The age dynamics
of childbearing are very different for men, and a biological threshold for
late fertility is not as easily defined as for women. They are able to have
children much later and are less constrained by social norms on age limits
(La Rochebrochard et al. 2006; Sartorius and Nieschlag 2010; Billari et al.
2011). A parallel exploration of female and male ages at “late” fertility
would provide a useful means to refine the definition of late parenthood
for men.
Trends in late and extremely late fertility have rarely been examined in
a comparative perspective over the very long term. In particular, we know
very little about the timing and scale of these trends after the onset of fer-
tility postponement, and whether they varied across countries. Moreover,
existing studies rarely focus on men, or do so only for specific countries
(Bessin, Levilain and Régnier-Loilier 2005; Prioux 2005; Moguérou et al.
2011). Using age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) from the Human Fertility
Database and Human Fertility Collection, we compare 19 European coun-
tries, the United States, and Japan. Focusing first on women, we study the
very long-term prevalence of “late” (40–59 years of age) and “extremely
late” (48–59 years) childbearing in several low-fertility countries between
1950 and 2016. We compare the speed of diffusion of late first births across
low-fertility countries since the onset of postponement and study whether
the increase is still ongoing several decades later. We then contrast age lim-
its for male and female late fertility over time. In the final discussion, we
suggest new avenues for research on important issues related to postponed
childbearing and late fertility.
Contrasting patterns of late childbearing since
1950
Late fertility is most prevalent both when large families are frequent be-
cause high-order births occur at higher ages, and when family formation is
postponed to late ages because late first and second births are more numer-
ous (Prioux 2005; Billari et al. 2007a; Moguérou et al. 2011). Family size
in the 1950s and the speed of its decrease until the 1970s, as well as the
timeframe of delayed family formation in the following years, are decisive
factors for understanding cross-country variations in late fertility. We de-
scribe here these changes across time and place and detail the underlying
mechanisms that may have been driving late childbearing since the onset
of “fertility postponement.”
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Decline in prevalence of large families and in late
parenthood until the 1970s
Contraception and marriage timing were important mechanisms behind
family size and age at childbearing after World War II. In the 1950s, most
births took place within marriage, and age at marriage was quite high,
with variability across Europe (Sardon 1992): 24–25 years in the West and
around 23 in Poland and Hungary. After marriage, as contraception was
only partially effective, individuals were at risk of having children even at
late ages, so late parenthood was frequent (Prioux 2005; Billari et al. 2007a;
Beaujouan and Sobotka 2019). Across countries for which the relevant data
are available, the share of very large families varied widely, but could be
considerable: more than 30 percent of all women had four or more chil-
dren in the Netherlands and Portugal, around 20 percent in Hungary, the
United States, and Italy, but just 15 percent in the Czech Republic (calcu-
lations from Human Fertility Database). In 1950, total fertility rates (TFR)
ranged from 2.0 to 3.5 children per woman, with the lowest fertility lev-
els observed in the north of Europe (2–2.5), and the highest levels in the
non-European English-speaking countries and Japan (3–3.5) (Sardon 2006;
Frejka, Jones and Sardon 2010). In the Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries, TFRs ranged from 2.5 to 3.5 children per woman (Sardon 2006;
Sobotka 2011). We expect countries with many large families in the 1950s
(for instance, the Netherlands and Portugal) to have had the largest shares
of late parents, all birth orders combined. They certainly also experienced
extremely late (age 48+) high-order births. We postulate that the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, given their earlier family formation and rel-
atively low fertility had a rather low prevalence of late fertility in the 1950s.
The two following decades were a time of increasing conformity of
family behaviors (Coontz 2006). With the advent of effective contracep-
tive methods in the early 1960s, very large families soon became less
frequent in all these countries, replaced by the new norm of the two-
child family (The ESHRE CapriWorkshop Group 2010; Mills et al. 2011;
Brzozowska et al. 2017). In Europe,mean age at firstmarriage reached a low
of 22–23 years around 1975, with little age variability (Sardon 1992). Par-
ticularly, late marriage retreated. For instance, in Austria, female marriage
rates after age 40 were 3.5 times lower in 1980 than in 1950 (Prioux 1992).
The United States was a major exception. Age at marriage in that country
had already reached its lowest level—around 20 years on average—in the
1950s, and remained below 21 until the early 1970s (Schoen and Canudas-
Romo 2005). In Japan, mean age at marriage was already on the rise in
the 1970s, after a low of around 23 years in 1947 (Population Statistics of
Japan 2017). On average, first births were earliest in the 1970s (Neels et al.
2017). Under the combined effect of early family formation and shrinking
numbers of large families, late fertility reached its lowest level in the 1970s
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(Prioux 2005; Billari et al. 2007a; Beaujouan and Sobotka 2019). We posit
that this decrease was universal, though earlier in Japan and starting from
lower levels in Eastern Europe and that this conformity of family behaviors
led to more uniform contribution of late fertility to the overall fertility lev-
els. We also postulate that extremely late childbearing almost disappeared
at that time.
A phase of expansion of late parenthood driven by
later entry into parenthood
The latest and still ongoing phase, more generally known as the SDT (see,
e.g., Lesthaeghe 2010), is a period of profound societal transformation to-
ward diversity in the family (van de Kaa 1987; Inglehart and Baker 2000;
Bonvalet, Clément and Ogg 2014). In the presence of efficient contracep-
tion and in the midst of growing individualism, childbearing lost some of its
“centrality,” and becamemostly a way to improve one’s own life satisfaction
and self-fulfillment rather than to comply with the norms of familism (van
de Kaa 1987). This shift in norms and values went together with a change
in family-related behaviors: later union formation, spread of nonmarital co-
habitation and childbearing, growing union instability, and rising voluntary
childlessness (Sobotka 2008; Sobotka and Toulemon 2008; Coleman 2013;
Vergauwen 2016). Men and women started to retreat from childbearing
at younger ages, and then—generally but not always—went on to have
children at later ages (Ní Bhrolcháin and Toulemon 2005; Beaujouan and
Toulemon 2019).
Age at first birth rose sharply, starting in the early 1970s in Western
Europe and in the early 1990s in the East (Sobotka 2004; Neels et al. 2017).
Only in the United States was the rise less dramatic: In 2014 mean age at
first birth was still 26.3 years, against around 29 in many other countries
(Mathews and Hamilton 2016; Neels et al. 2017). The later start in the east
did not prevent countries such as Hungary from reaching a mean age at first
birth of 28 years in the early 2010s, just below most of Western Europe. In
parallel, fertility rates decreased until the early 2000s, reaching the lowest
levels in the southern European countries, CEE countries, and Japan, but
remaining relatively high in the English-speaking, Nordic and Western Eu-
ropean countries (Frejka et al. 2010; Sobotka et al. 2018). Since 2010, the
rates have started to converge at between 1.5 and 1.8 children per woman
across the European regions and the United States in 2016, except in south-
ern Europe and in Japan, where they remain extremely low (at around 1.3
and 1.4 children per woman, respectively).
Retreat from early childbearing (say, before 30) has been attributed to
a wealth of causes partly embedded in the SDT, such as efficient contra-
ception; rising preference for competing activities such as leisure or work;
greater union instability; worsening economic security, etc. (Mills et al.
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2011; Barclay and Myrskylä 2016; Beaujouan and Toulemon 2019). Ad-
ditional factors have led to a mechanical deferral of childbearing by a few
years. These include the longer time spent in education and the rise of youth
unemployment, which delay economic independence (Winkler-Dworak
and Toulemon 2007; Kreyenfeld et al. 2012; Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan
2012; Neels 2015). A second set of factors affect fertility in the second part
of the life course (Beaujouan and Toulemon 2019). The large increase in
healthy life expectancy has made it feasible to envisage parenthood at older
ages, and improvements in perinatal healthcare have reduced the risks as-
sociated with later childbearing (Prioux 2004; Kotelchuck 2007). New op-
portunities to have children at later ages have also emerged, such as late
union formation and repartnering after union dissolution (e.g., stepfami-
lies). Finally, in the countries under study, between 20 and 40 percent of the
women in the 1966–1970 birth cohorts were university graduates, against
5–20 percent in the 1936–1940 cohorts (Brzozowska et al. 2017). Given
that highly educated women have their children particularly late (Rendall
et al. 2010), this has certainly been a driver of late childbearing over the last
decades. The rise in late and very late fertility may have been particularly
strong in settings where unions are now most diverse and highly educated
women are most numerous, for instance, in the Nordic countries.
New dynamics have arisen from these new situations: at more ad-
vanced stages of their life course, adults have become used to living a “child-
free” life, have built a career and developed other life goals, so their attitudes
to childbearing are liable to change (see, e.g., Keizer, Dykstra, and Jansen
2008; Buhr and Huinink 2017; Gemmill 2018). While today more than 90
percent of childless women in their early 20s still wish to have a child,
as they advance in life the intentions of those who are still childless tend
to change (temporarily or permanently), particularly after age 30 (Gray,
Evans, and Reimondos 2013; Rybin´ska and Morgan 2019). These mech-
anisms used to result in generally low childbearing intentions at age 40.
On the other hand, the enduring “preference for children” across the low-
fertility countries means that a nonnegligible number of women still wish
a child even after reaching older ages: with fertility postponement, the pro-
portion of childless women at age 40wishing to have a child has increased in
the last decades, from 3.5 percent in 1986 to 29.8 percent in 2016 in Austria,
for example (Beaujouan 2018). This indicates a change in attitudes toward
late childbearing, but particularly reflects the fact that constraints at earlier
ages are so strong that people now want children at ages where they are
much less likely to succeed. Postponement of childbearing to successively
older ages may be particularly frequent in countries where the employment
conditions at young ages are more difficult, and where conflicting demands,
such as the difficulty of combining work and family life, are particularly
salient (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002). Southern Europe is affected by a
combination of these two factors (Zuanna 2001; Caltabiano 2016), while the
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impact of the latter constraint is extreme in south-east Asia (see, e.g., Frejka
et al. 2010; Gauthier 2016). These countries, where TFRs are the lowest and
childlessness highest, may therefore exhibit a particularly large share of late
and extremely late births, with a shift toward “latest-late” fertility.
The rise in late childbearing across the low-fertility countries is inter-
esting to study because it is not only the inexorable consequence of birth
postponement, but also certainly reflects the diversity of childbearing norms
and constraints across different countries. After the low levels of the 1970s,
we expect to see a rise in the prevalence of late first births across all countries
following the onset of postponement. As this trend started later in Eastern
Europe, we postulate that late fertility in the east has not (yet) reached the
levels observed in the other countries. However, the rise may have been
faster as these Eastern countries lived through uncertain economic times
and their family-friendly policies were discontinued in the 1990s as poli-
cies became increasingly oriented toward the market (Sobotka 2011): Their
age at first birth has increased more rapidly than in most countries of West-
ern Europe. In addition, we expect the prevalence of late first childbirth to
have increased the most in countries with severe obstacles to earlier child-
bearing, particularly in southern Europe and Japan. Finally, the extent of
fertility postponement has increased the number of people trying to have
a child at unusual ages for a first birth (Beaujouan 2018). Combined with
the increasing availability of ART, this increases the number of people po-
tentially able to have a child at these ages. Extremely late first births may
thus become more visible in the very recent period.
Women and men under different constraints
Men and women differ strikingly in the amount of physiological time they
have to form and enlarge a family (Fisch and Braun 2005). This difference
is of major importance in societies where family formation is becoming in-
creasingly delayed: while men can adapt to postponement, the problem is
more complex for women, whose chances of a conception leading to a live
birth decrease substantially from age 35. Researchers have used microsim-
ulation to show that for women, fertility postponement leads to more in-
voluntary childlessness and smaller families, less so in the Czech Republic
and Austria, but more so in Spain and the Netherlands (Leridon and Slama
2008; te Velde et al. 2012; Habbema et al. 2015). Demand for ART devel-
oped in recent decades becomes particularly high from age 35. In 2015 in
the United States, around 1 percent of all births before age 35 were achieved
using in vitro fertilization, versus 3.8 percent at aged 35–37 and 37.7 per-
cent after age 44 (Beaujouan and Sobotka 2019). However, ART cannot yet
be used to reverse age-related biological limitations (Leridon 2004). From
age 35, any additional delay comes with an increased risk for women of not
having the birth they desire, be it a first or higher order child.
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Male infertility also increases with age, but later and much less dras-
tically than among women (La Rochebrochard et al. 2006; Eisenberg and
Meldrum 2017). This biological difference is socially reinforced (Schmidt
et al. 2012): men are often several years older than their female partners
(Ní Bhrolcháin and Sigle-Rushton 2005) and social norms on the upper age
limit for having a child are stronger for women than for men (Billari et al.
2011). In the 2006–2007 European Social Survey covering 25 countries,
the average social cutoff point for childbearing was 41.7 years for women,
but much higher, at 47.3 years, for men (Billari et al. 2011). Under these
constraints, men and women have unequal access to parenthood at later
ages, although the extent of this difference remains to be assessed (but see
Moguérou et al. 2011 for France). In Western and Northern Europe in par-
ticular, women’s and men’s educational and employment trajectories are
becoming increasingly similar, as are their family trajectories (Lesnard et al.
2016). While women are having their children later and later, is this also
the case among men?
Research that systematically compares male and female family be-
havior, or addresses only men’s behaviors, has become more frequent
but is largely outweighed by the numerous studies focusing on women
(Keizer, Dykstra, and Poortman 2010; Lappegård, Rønsen, and Skrede 2011;
Moguérou et al. 2011). Childbearing and family health have long been con-
sidered as female matters, and data on men have rarely been collected.
Moreover, the quality of available data on male family events is recognized
to be of poorer quality than that of those available concerning women. For
example, men may not always be aware of their parenthood in the case of
extrapartnership births; more often than for women, men are not at home
when a survey is conducted and another person present in the household
(“proxy”) answers the questions on their behalf; and men may not report
their children as accurately as women (Rendall et al. 1999; Joyner et al.
2012). This is compounded by the difficulty of identifying men’s children;
while women are directly linked to their child in the birth registers, the
father’s characteristics are often missing (Dudel and Klüsener 2018). Male
age- ASFRs, necessary to our study, are no exception, and are generally not
routinely available (Schoumaker 2015). We take advantage of a series of
male ASFRs recently constructed by Dudel and Klüsener (2018) to com-
pare male and female late fertility.
Data and method
For women, our study relies on birth indicators available from the Human
Fertility Database (Jasilioniene et al. 2007), which gives data on numbers
of births—overall or by birth order, by year or by birth cohort—drawn from
birth registers and other official and validated sources. The female popula-
tion exposure is estimated using data on population size and deaths from
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the Human Mortality Database. For our study, we use female period AS-
FRs, age-specific first birth rates (ASFR1), and age-specific second birth rates
(ASFR2) available for women aged 15–59 in most countries. In a few coun-
tries, they are available only up to age 55, but given that births at age 55–59
represent less than 0.1 percent of births at age 40–59 this will not influence
our study of late parenthood. Before being entered into the database, the
original data are not always provided by single year of age, so “round” ages
(e.g., 40 or 45) are used to present late fertility. For a few countries, we do
know fertility rates by single ages until age 49 (and then in a broad 50–59
age group, except in Hungary and Spain, 50–55); we use these countries for
our study of extremely late fertility.
The ASFR series generally cover the years from the 1950s, spanning
back to the first half of the twentieth century in a few countries. Age-specific
rates by birth order are not available in all the countries where ASFRs are
available, and the series are generally shorter. For the study of long-term
trends among women, we thus focus on six countries for which data on first
births span back to the early 1950s (Austria, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands,
the United States, and Japan since 1967), and that are also distributed across
the main low-fertility areas: respectively, the German-speaking countries,
Central Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe, and the English-
speaking countries. Japan is free standing because low fertility there pre-
ceded the other East Asian countries by 20 years (Frejka et al. 2010). Since
we also have data by single year of age for these countries, we can present
them consistently in the parts of the paper covering late childbearing trends
among women. Note that the female indicators we constructed for this
study are provided in the online Supporting Information for all the coun-
tries and all available years, even when the country was not selected in the
paper. For Austria we use data from the Human Fertility Collection (Šťastná
and Sobotka 2009), and for Italy data provided directly by IStat (“mothers’
ASFRs”).
We adopted Sobotka’s definition (2004, 52) for the year of onset of
postponement, that is the first year after 1965 when mean age at first birth
showed an increase which lasted for three or more calendar years and led
to a total increase of at least 0.5 years of age. He proposes an alternative
definition to that of Kohler et al. (2002), for whom the year of onset of
postponement is the first in a span of three years during which the mean
age at first birth increases by more than 0.3 years. After checks for two
thirds of the countries using the Human Fertility Database series of age at
first birth, we concluded that the onset calculated using Sobotka’s definition
was generally two to three years earlier than that obtained under the alter-
native definition, but appeared as the beginning of a series rather than one
(sometimes isolated) point, and better represented slow starts (as in the ex-
ceptional cases of Hungary where it was 13 years earlier than under Kohler
et al.’s definition, and Japan, where it was 17 years earlier). Except in these
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two countries, the choice of definition does not greatly affect the relative
timing of onset of postponement between countries nor the strength of the
increase in late fertility levels because these levels were rising very slowly
at the beginning of the postponement phase.
Male ASFRs since 1990 are provided by Dudel and Klüsener (2019)
who reconstructed them based on birth registers, and more precisely on the
age of the fathers of children born each year up to age 59. They are avail-
able in the Human Fertility Collection. The proportion of missing values
in these data is variable, however, ranging from small (less than 2 percent,
e.g., in Sweden) to considerable (up to 47 percent on one year in Denmark),
though it is generally below 10 percent (Dudel and Klüsener 2019). To ad-
dress this problem, they tested a conditional method for attributing missing
paternal birth dates that also relies on the known mother’s age, comparing
it to the usual attribution along the fathers’ age distribution. They found
a maximum bias of around 1 percent in mean age at childbirth when us-
ing their method (Dudel and Klüsener 2018, supplementary material), that
still depends on the proportion of missing values and on their distribution.
Unfortunately, countries for which male data are available do not always
correspond to the countries for which we have long female series, so the
countries for which male and female ASFRs are compared differ somewhat
from those analyzed in other parts of the paper.
We first calculate the contribution of births at age 40 and above to
the TFR by summing the ASFRs at age 40–59 and dividing them by the
TFR. We calculate the contribution of first births at age 40 and above to the
first birth rate (TFR1) in the same way. This is done for all years across all
countries. In addition, we present the sum of first, second, and all birth rates
at age 48 and above in the countries where this is possible (the choice of age
thresholds is explained in the introduction). To examine more closely the
speed of diffusion of late births across different countries, we represent the
relative increase in the contribution of first births at age 40 and above to the
TFR1, taking as starting point the year of onset of postponement. Last, to
compare men and women, we show the contribution to the TFR of all births
at aged 40+/45+ for women, and at aged 45+/55+ for men. Contributions
are shown for two time points (1990 and 2014), andwe calculate the change
over time separately for men and women to see whether the recent increase
in the share of late births is stronger among men or women.
Results
Late childbearing trends among women
Figure 1 shows late fertility trends since the 1950s in selected countries
across the main low-fertility regions. We first give the contribution of births
to women aged 40 and above to the TFR (Figure 1a). In the 1950s, this
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FIGURE 1 Contribution of women aged 40–59 to (a) total fertility rate, (b)
first birth rate, 1950–2015, selected countries
NOTE: Trends for all countries are available in the Human Fertility Database and trends in contribution to
second birth rates are provided in the online Supporting Information.
SOURCE: Human Fertility database, Human Fertility Collection for first births in Austria until 1983 and
Italy until 2003.
contribution was higher than today and was notably much more diverse
across countries—it generally corresponded to the share of very large fami-
lies at that time (see online Supporting Information for more countries such
as Portugal). It then declined until 1985 in most low-fertility countries and
increased again afterwards, to levels which are generally more similar to-
day than in the 1950s. In the Netherlands and Japan, the initial drop was
very sharp due to an extremely rapid decrease in family size. Late fertility
remained most frequent in Italy (and more generally Southern Europe, see
online Supporting Information) after the initial decrease. In countries like
Austria and the United States, the drop was moderate, notably following a
resurgence of larger families during the baby boom. Finally, in Hungary—
as in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe for which data are
available—the share of late fertility was among the lowest, notably due to
the low prevalence of large families since World War II.
As noted before, family size limitation is a factor behind the initial de-
crease in late fertility, but it does not explain its subsequent resurgence.
Fertility postponement, on the other hand, has increased the share of first
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and second births occurring after age 40. Taking the extreme example of the
Netherlands, while 90 percent of births at age 40 and above in the 1950s
were third or higher order births, today, 60 percent are first and second
births (author’s calculations from Human Fertility Database). The contribu-
tion of first births at age 40 and above to first birth rates started increasing
substantially from the mid-1980s onwards, ranging between 2 and 5 per-
cent in the mid-2010s in the countries under study (Figure 1b). Late first
births were slightly more numerous in the 1950s than in the deeper low of
the 1980s, because marriages were taking place later at that time, spreading
to later ages, and contraception was not yet very effective: There were more
persons “at risk” of having a late first child.
Second births should also bementioned here. The ideal number of chil-
dren is predominantly two in Europe (Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014), and
most people want a second child, particularly in Western Europe. Second
births occur later than first births on average, so given their high frequency,
they are likely to occur more frequently at late ages than first births. The
country patterns of the contributions of late second births to second birth
rates are relatively similar to those for first births, so they are not shown
here, but they are available in the online Supporting Information. More
second than first births are late, and this has always been the case. On the
other hand, they are also more likely to be constrained by age-related infer-
tility than first births. Second births at later ages may thus be increasingly
limited by the age barrier, and their proportion among all second births, if
not stagnant, may rise less quickly than in the past. Such an effect is not gen-
erally observed, however. The contribution of second births at age 40 and
above to the second birth rate has increased strongly since the late 1980s;
only in Italy, where that contribution is particularly large, has the increase
slowed down somewhat in recent years.
In Table 1, we examine births and first births at age 48 and above,
events which are so rare that the rates are expressed in units per 10,000
women. Mean age at first birth, and first and second birth rates at age 40
and above are given for reference here and throughout the paper.
Fertility rates summed over age 48 and above were often higher than
now or at equivalent levels in the 1950s (Table 1): more women were hav-
ing many children so more were giving birth at these ages. Births at age
48 and above are thus not only the result of increased use of ART; they
were already taking place in earlier times when exposure was high, that
is when married women were at risk of conception because of ineffective
contraception. First and second births at age 48 are becoming more vis-
ible, however, and are more frequent today than at any other observed
time. While mostly between 0 and 0.5 children per 10,000 women in 1995,
first birth rates summed for age 48 and above now often reach more than
2 per 10,000 women. In Italy and Spain, they reached, respectively, 9.3 and
5.8 children per 10,000 women in 2015. The numbers remain minute, but
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TABLE 1 Key indicators of very late first births in selected low-fertility
countries
TFR per
10,000
women
First birth rate
per 10,000
women
Second birth
rate per 10,000
women
Country Year
Mean
age at
first
birth
Age
48–59
Age
40–59
Age
48–59
Age
40–59
Age
48–59
Austria 1955 25.0 5.5 85.3 0.5 146.0 0.6
1975 23.6 2.1 42.4 0.4 64.7 0.7
1995 25.7 0.8 32.9 0.0 42.9 0.2
2015 29.2 5.3 178.5 2.5 183.7 1.6
Denmark 1955 - 2.8 - - - -
1975 23.9 0.7 22.0 0.1 30.8 0.0
1995 27.2 0.2 45.0 0.0 76.1 0.1
2015 29.2 3.7 140.4 1.0 197.6 0.7
Hungary 1955 23.4 5.6 61.6 1.0 97.0 0.5
1975 22.6 0.9 21.3 0.2 33.8 0.2
1995 23.8 1.1 19.2 0.2 29.3 0.2
2015 27.9 1.9 116.5 1.0 147.4 0.4
Italy 1955 25.8 7.6 81.8 0.2 119.4 0.3
1975 24.7 3.8 79.8 0.2 115.8 0.2
1995 28.1 0.8 73.0 0.3 105.4 0.5
2015 30.8 13.3 318.7 9.3 353.0 4.9
Japan 1955 - 7.3 - - - -
1975 25.7 0.3 27.0 0.1 27.9 0.0
1995 27.8 0.2 36.0 0.0 44.2 0.0
2015 30.0 1.5 222.4 1.0 211.2 0.3
Netherlands 1955 26.2 9.9 79.6 0.2 134.5 0.5
1975 25.2 2.2 24.2 0.2 43.2 0.3
1995 28.4 3.1 54.5 0.8 73.5 0.3
2015 29.7 4.2 152.1 2.1 168.5 0.9
Norway 1955 - - - - - -
1975 23.5 0.5 25.7 0.3 52.5 0.0
1995 26.3 0.4 44.7 0.1 81.2 0.0
2014 28.7 7.4 140.3 1.2 205.3 0.8
Spain 1955 - - - - - -
1975 25.1 16.3 90.5 1.9 126.1 1.0
1996 28.4 1.3 59.8 0.5 74.2 0.3
2015 30.7 10.1 335.6 5.8 345.9 2.9
Sweden 1955 - 3.7 - - - -
1975 24.3 1.0 27.2 0.1 38.2 0.0
1995 27.2 1.0 63.8 0.3 100.8 0.2
2015 29.2 10.1 189.6 2.6 250.2 2.0
/...
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TABLE 1 (continued)
TFR per
10,000
women
First birth rate
per 10,000
women
Second birth
rate per 10,000
women
Country Year
Mean
age at
first
birth
Age
48–59
Age
40–59
Age
48–59
Age
40–59
Age
48–59
United States 1935 23.4 13.2 30.4 0.4 41.6 0.3
1955 22.8 4.7 54.5 0.4 87.1 0.2
1975 22.8 0.8 15.5 0.0 22.4 0.0
1995 24.6 1.3 70.1 0.3 87.8 0.3
2015 27.0 8.3 133.3 2.8 165.6 2.1
NOTE: - = not available. TFR at age 48–59 corresponds to the sum of ASFR from age 48 to 59; likewise for the
other indicators. In Hungary and Spain only, the last age is 55. In the United States for the years 1975 and 1995,
we cover only births up to age 50. First and second birth rates at age 48–59 are smoothed over the two
surrounding years (e.g., 2014–2016 for 2015). For Spain, in 1955, fertility after age 45 is not available by age
but by age groups in the original data used for the construction of the Human Fertility Database rates, so we
cannot show it; there is also a problem in the classification by birth order between 1980 and 1995, so we show
1996 here. Sums of ASFR, ASFR1, and ASFR2 at aged 48–59 for all the countries available in the Human
Fertility Database are provided in the online Supporting Information.
SOURCE: Human Fertility Database, Human Fertility Collection for Austria, IStat for Italy.
the increases are very large. Note that conditional first birth rates (i.e., only
among women who are still childless) at age 48 also rose between 1995
and 2015, but we could not retrieve this information for all countries or for
all years, so it is not shown. This reflects an increased propensity to have
children among childless women at age 48 and above and suggests that
the increasing demand for extremely late births observed in the last two
decades has been at least partly met thanks to ART. Interestingly, Billari
et al. (2007a, Figure 3) observed very little increase in first births after age
48 in Sweden because their series ended in 2002, but first births at those
ages started reachingmore substantial numbers shortly after (see also online
Supporting Information).
The sum of second birth rates at age 40 and over remains larger than
that of first birth rates. However, second birth rates at age 48 and above are
generally lower today than first birth rates at those ages. This was not al-
ways the case in the past, and we observe the opposite in Austria, Italy, and
the Netherlands in 1955. This reflects a change over time in the dynamic of
first and second births; in a regime of natural conception, the share of late
second births was mechanically larger than that of late first births. Today, a
large proportion of extremely late births are achieved via assisted reproduc-
tion, at least in the United States (Beaujouan and Sobotka 2019), and our
observations suggest that having a child at very advanced reproductive ages
reflects a desire to have “at least one child” rather than to enlarge a family.
Fertility postponement and late motherhood
Analysis of trends in late first births since the onset of fertility postponement
reinforces our cross-country comparison. Year of onset of postponement
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FIGURE 2 Contribution of women aged 40+ to first birth rates, 2014 versus
year of onset of postponement, low-fertility countries
NOTE: Year 2013 for Western and Eastern Germany. The year of onset of postponement is the first year after
1965 when MAFB showed an increase which lasted for three or more calendar years and led to a total increase
of at least 0.5 years of age (Sobotka 2004, 52).
SOURCES: Human Fertility Database and Collection, and Sobotka (2004, table 3.3, 53) for the year of onset of
postponement.
and contribution of late first births to current first birth rates are correlated
across countries (Figure 2). Where postponement started earlier—in the
early 1970s primarily inWestern Europe, Japan, and the United States—the
contribution of first births after age 40 to the total first birth rate in 2014 was
largest (3–5 percent after age 40, Figure 2). Where postponement started in
the first half of the 1980s, 2–4 percent of first births were to women aged
40 or higher, except in the South. Finally, in Eastern Europe, where mean
age at first birth started increasing in the 1990s, late first births are in the
lowest range of 2–3 percent.
Independently from their year of onset of postponement, shares of late
first births have increased spectacularly in Spain and Italy, accounting for
around 6 percent of the total first birth rate. Though late parenthood was
always prevalent in these countries where familism seems to contribute to
later home leaving and thus to later family formation (Reher 1998; Zuanna
2001), the recent levels possibly reflect the increased constraints to fam-
ily formation resulting from the lasting economic crisis. Interestingly, in the
countries considered asmost advanced in the SDT andwith the largest share
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of highly educated women, such as the Nordic countries, there is not a par-
ticularly strong propensity to have children at age 40 or above.
The upturn in late first births since the onset of postponement also
helps in differentiating countries. Some countries where the contribution
of late first births to total first birth rates was originally very low, as well as
some countries where postponement started later, may be catching up.
Figure 3 displays the change in the contribution of first births at age
40+ to total first birth rates, relative to the level on the year of onset of post-
ponement. The gray scale indicates the level of contribution on the year of
onset: the darker it is, the larger the share represented by first births at age
40+ in the total first birth rate. The West and East of Europe are on two
separate graphs to recall their very different years of postponement onset,
but their gray scale is the same, giving a continuity to the comparison. The
diffusion of late first births was slow and rather similar across most countries
for the first 15–20 years after the onset of postponement. Only in countries
with initially low levels of late fertility within their group did diffusion occur
faster (United States and Sweden in the West) or even much faster (Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia in the East). Austria was an exception; de-
spite an initial contribution of 0.37 percent to first births, late first births
spread very fast and intensively. After 20 years, the speed of diffusion began
to differentiate across countries. In Japan, for example, 39 years after the
onset of postponement the contribution of births at age 40+ to the first birth
rate had increased almost 10-fold. In other countries such as the Nether-
lands or Norway, the increase was only fourfold over 42 years. In Hungary,
the increase accelerated strongly after 25 years (note that under the alterna-
tive definition of onset of postponement, in Hungary it would have started
13 years later and thus Hungary would have been clustered with the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia). Importantly, the increase in the share of
women having children after age 40 is not levelling off. Only in Sweden
and Denmark has the increase become somewhat less pronounced. This is
also the case for second births (online Supporting Information), but more
years of observation are necessary to draw any conclusions.
Late fertility among women and men
The age threshold of “late” childbearing is earlier for women than for men.
In fact, across all countries the contribution of births at age 40+ among
women is very similar to the contributions at age 45+ for men (between 2
and 6 percent), and there are no outliers (Figure 4). With quite similar age
differences between partners across low-fertility countries today (Nitsche
et al. 2018), the mechanisms of family formation certainly contribute to
the regularity of these gender differences in late fertility. Besides the five-
year age difference, male late fertility is spread much more widely across
late ages than that of women, continuing up to age 59 and beyond. Male
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FIGURE 3 Increase in contribution of first births at 40+ to first birth rates in
(a) West of Europe, United States and Japan and (b) East of Europe; starting
point = year of onset of postponement. Detailed by level of contribution at
onset of postponement
SOURCES: Human Fertility Database and Collection and Sobotka (2004, Table 3.3, 53) for the year of onset of
postponement.
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FIGURE 4 Contribution of women aged 40+ years to the TFR versus
contribution of men aged 45+, 2014
SOURCE: Human Fertility Database for females; ABS, Australia; Eurostat, Denmark; Canada, 2011; France and
Germany 2013. Dudel and Klüsener (2019) for males (in Human Fertility Collection).
fertility at age 55 and over still accounted for up to 0.5 percent of the TFR in
some countries in 1990 and 2014, a proportion higher than that of births to
women aged 45 and over (Table 2). Only a few thousand women give birth
after age 50 across Europe and the United States (Sobotka and Beaujouan
2018).
The increase in late childbearing also concerns men, among whom
births at age 45+ represented up to 3.1 percent of the TFR in 1990 and up
to 5 percent in 2014 (Table 2). For women, these proportions were, respec-
tively, 0.2 and 0.4 percent. In a few countries, the increase in contribution
from age 45 onwardswas equivalent formen andwomen (Hungary, Poland,
Portugal), but inmost countries it was strongest amongwomen. Particularly
in the English-speaking countries (Australia, Canada, USA, and to a lesser
extent England), the increase among women was around 10 times that of
men. These results generally hold when comparing the rise in female con-
tributions above age 40 and in male contributions above age 45. The in-
crease in births at ages above 55 was also quite small among men in most
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TABLE 2 Contribution of late births to TFR and increase between 1990 and
2014, men and women
Women Men
45+ 45+ 55+
Country 1990 2014
Percentage
increase 1990 2014
Percentage
increase 1990 2014
Percentage
increase
Australia 0.1 0.3 419 3.1 4.7 49 0.5 0.5 16
Canada* 0.0 0.2 423 2.5 3.5 40 0.3 0.3 11
Denmark 0.0 0.2 272 2.5 3.5 39 0.3 0.3 4
England 0.1 0.3 198 3.1 4.7 53 0.5 0.5 0
Estonia 0.1 0.2 210 2.1 5.0 142 0.2 0.4 142
Finland 0.1 0.2 144 2.5 3.9 57 0.2 0.3 29
Germany* 0.1 0.2 172 2.7 4.4 64 0.2 0.4 61
Hungary 0.0 0.1 257 1.4 4.6 222 0.2 0.4 191
Poland 0.1 0.1 51 2.0 2.9 44 0.2 0.2 30
Portugal 0.2 0.2 48 2.7 4.1 48 0.1 0.1 19
Spain 0.2 0.4 168 2.6 4.9 90 0.2 0.5 131
Sweden 0.1 0.2 340 2.2 4.5 101 0.0 0.0 −100
United States 0.1 0.2 292 2.8 3.6 29 0.4 0.4 −9
SOURCE: Human Fertility database for females; ABS, Australia; Eurostat, Denmark; Canada, 2011; France and
Germany 2013. Dudel and Klüsener (2019) for males (in Human Fertility Collection).
countries, and even fell back in Sweden and the United States. With an ini-
tially lower incidence of very late fertility than men, it is generally women
who have seen the largest increase in recent decades.
Discussion and research avenues
This study confirms that the characteristics of late fertility have changed
since the 1950s: while at that time most late births were higher order births,
today they are primarily first and second births. In the past, cross-country
diversity in late fertility thus reflected differences in family size. Today, it
mostly reflects the stage of fertility postponement that each country has
reached. “Exposure” to late childbearing is an essential aspect of late fertility.
For instance in the 1950s, first births at late ages among women occurred
relatively more often than in the 1970s, and this was certainly linked to
later marriage at that time. In addition, in times of natural conception and
very large families, extremely late second births (48+) were more frequent
than extremely late first births. Today, extremely late childbearing mostly
concerns first births. Childless women who want at least one child are chal-
lenging the natural fertility barriers, while older mothers often appear to
forego a second birth.
We observed that the rise in late childbearing is continuing and even
accelerating in several countries. In terms of the contribution of births at age
40 and above to the female TFR, the levels of the 1950s have often not been
surpassed. However, the contributions of late first births to first birth rates
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have risen to values not observed in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, and certainly never before that. Today, late first births are also frequent
in Central and Eastern Europe, and their prevalence across the low-fertility
countries depends largely on the time since onset of childbearing postpone-
ment in each country. Still, in countries where late first births were initially
rare, the increase has been generally faster than in other countries of the
same region; in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia, it began almost
immediately after the onset of postponement and was particularly fast. In
Austria, postponement onset was rather late but the pace of increase in late
first births was fast relative to the other Western countries.
In Italy, Spain, and Japan, late first births have risen to particularly
high levels, in relative and absolute terms. These countries, with very low
TFRs and high levels of childlessness, offer little institutional support to com-
bine a career and parenting and, for many years, offered a rather traditional
“marriage package” to women that was unable to satisfy their general as-
pirations to gender equality (De Rose and Racioppi 2008; Bumpass et al.
2009; Arpino, Esping-Andersen, and Pessin 2015). Spain and Italy were
also particularly affected by chronic youth unemployment and the Great
Recession (Matysiak et al. 2018). Many women whose lives were difficult
during the usual childbearing years may have tried to have at least one child
“before it was too late” after repeated birth postponements. Their high levels
of late fertility are somehow setting an ever-later threshold for childbear-
ing capacity in other countries where late fertility is growing quickly. These
other countries still have a considerable margin for postponing childbear-
ing toward “latest-late” fertility, but probably at the cost of more recourse to
ART and of more involuntary childlessness. In our study, we found no clear
link between the markers of the SDT and late childbearing prevalence: In
some countries with large rises in union dissolution and major normative
changes, such as the Nordic countries, the relative share of late fertility is
not particularly large, while in others where the SDT started later, such as
Italy, prevalence is increasing at a remarkable pace.
The upturn in late fertility has spawned a growing number of studies
that investigate its epidemiological, social, and demographic consequences.
Very good overviews of the positive and negative individual consequences
of delayed motherhood in today’s society are available in the literature
(Mills et al. 2011; Schmidt et al. 2012; Myrskylä, Barclay, and Goisis 2017).
On the one hand, today’s older parents have a better quality of life, pro-
viding their children with more economic resources (Powell, Steelman,
and Carini 2007) and greater stability (Musick and Michelmore 2018);
older mothers are less likely to smoke during pregnancy and more often
have high socioeconomic status (Goisis, Schneider, and Myrskylä 2018a);
they also experience higher subjective well-being after the birth of a child
(Myrskylä and Margolis 2014). On the other hand, childbearing from age
35 incurs more health risks for the mother and child (e.g., Schimmel et al.
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2015), despite huge improvements in perinatal healthcare since the 1990s
(Kotelchuck 2007; WHO 2014). Though it is generally acknowledged that
lifestyle is more important than mother’s age in explaining negative preg-
nancy outcomes (Myrskylä et al. 2017), old age at childbearing remains a
risk factor.
Men’s reproductive lifespan extends over many more years than
women’s, and only after age 55 does their contribution to the TFR become
comparable to that of women aged 45 or more. Though more rarely men-
tioned, late fatherhood also has positive and negative consequences. The
positive socioeconomic consequences for their children are by and large the
same as those offered by older mothers (Powell et al. 2007). Research has
also found negative consequences for risk of conception, pregnancy out-
comes, and child health among men as early as age 40 (La Rochebrochard
and Thonneau 2002; NyboAndersen andUrhoj 2017). Socioeconomic char-
acteristics only partially offset the risk of low birth weight and preterm de-
livery due to late paternal age (Goisis et al. 2018b). Finally, given that men
can become fathers up to very late ages, and that their life expectancy is
shorter than women’s, a further risk is that of the child losing its father
while still young. Indeed, based on simulations, Flammant (2019) suggests
that fertility postponement may help to explain why the number of orphans
in France has decreased so slowly in recent years. One of our findings mod-
erates this factor, however: the increase in late fertility between 1990 and
2014 among men was much more limited than among women, and ex-
tremely late fatherhood has even declined in a few countries.
The stronger acceleration of late fertility among women than men also
reflects the more radical change in women’s situation in recent decades.
Women’s life trajectories are increasingly similar to those of men (Lesnard
et al. 2016), and the massive increase in educational enrolment has con-
cerned women more than men (Breen et al. 2010). In addition, studies in
the Netherland and Spain show that since 1990 the age difference between
married partners has tended to decrease at older ages, or after controlling
for age (Van Poppel et al. 2001; Esteve, Cortina, and Cabré 2009), and this
also suggests greater uniformity. So far, women are postponing more than
men and becoming more similar to them in many respects. Nonetheless, in
terms of fertility, women are likely to become increasingly constrained by
age-related infecundity, while men can continue to postpone fatherhood if
necessary. Rather than tending toward convergence, gender inequalities in
childbearing may therefore be reinforced. Comparison of the recent compo-
sitional change in characteristics of late mothers and fathers, notably in edu-
cational attainment and labor force participation, as well as assortative mat-
ing behaviors, would certainly bring additional insights on future trends.
Since the upturn in late motherhood in the 1980s–1990s, particularly
for first and second births, the trend has often been viewed as a “social
problem,” not just by the media but also by governments (Moguérou et al.
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2011; Budds, Locke, and Burr 2013). Late fatherhood has always existed,
and many mothers in the past had their fourth or fifth child at a late age
without raising concerns of this type (Moguérou et al. 2011). Nonetheless,
though Frank, Bianchi, and Campana (1994) state that “the existence of
[assisted reproductive] technology is bound to modify thoughts and atti-
tudes to motherhood” (p. 366), the tendency is still to make couples, but
particularly women, individually responsible for the timing of their child-
bearing (Marshall and Woollett 2000). However, fertility postponement is
a societal phenomenon that arises from the changing economic conditions
and the transformation of life circumstances (Mills et al. 2011; Cooke Mills
and Lavender 2012). It results from the choices women and couples have to
make throughout their life course in transformed social settings, and more
than ever before, those who wish to have children need support rather than
blame for having them “too” late.
The current context of ongoing increase in late childbearing calls for
reflection onways to improve support for those who have reached later ages
without being able to form a family. In some countries, this may involve a
change in the legal and medical approach to ART (Vialle 2014). In addition,
older pregnant women need close perinatal follow-up, which has proved
to be effective in decreasing adverse maternal and child outcomes (Till, Ev-
eretts, and Haas 2012; WHO 2015; AAP Committee on Fetus and Newborn
and ACOG Committee on Obstetric Practice 2017; Marozio et al. 2017). To-
day more than ever, the growing demand for childbearing at advanced ages
is creating a need for cutting-edge medical assistance and considerate older
mothers’ management to prevent pregnancy complications (Marshall and
Woollett 2000; Carolan and Frankowska 2011).
Research avenues
Further investigations are needed to assess empirically whether an age
limit to childbearing, leading to a visible reduction in fertility levels, has
been reached due to fertility postponement. In the mid-2000s, Billari et al.
(2007b) did not find strong evidence that first births are becoming in-
creasingly compressed into a small (late) age range. Late fertility has in-
creased substantially since then, and in countries where fertility postpone-
ment is most advanced, first birth dispersion has stabilized in the last decade
(Nathan and Pardo 2019). Studies of “rectangularization” of fertility at older
ages could be repeated, as well as empirical exploration of the link between
fertility postponement and fertility and would probably yield more substan-
tive results, particularly in countries such as Italy or Spain where the delay
in entry into parenthood has been massive.
Knowledge of changes over time in fertility intentions at later ages
would improve our understanding of the “demand” side of late childbear-
ing. In Austria, fertility intentions at very late ages have risen, and the
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mismatch between cohort intentions to have children at later ages and late
childbearing is increasing (Beaujouan 2018). These findings suggest that,
despite the adaptation of women’s fertility intentions to their life-course ex-
perience, the increase over time in ultimate childlessness and the decrease
in family size do not necessarily reflect women wishes when approaching
the end of their reproductive life. On the other hand, except among those
who were childless, couples in Brazil were in general very satisfied with
their family size, even if it was smaller than initially intended (Alves de Car-
valho et al. 2018). Thewaywomen andmen adapt to fertility postponement
and deal with their unfulfilled intentions to have children is important to
explore.
Another avenue concerns the use of ART for late conceptions in differ-
ent countries, an area of research so far held back by the limited availability
and comparability of data (Calhaz-Jorge et al. 2017). Laws associated with
use of ART and its usual practice vary substantially from one country to
another, sometimes restricting its use despite potentially strong demand,
or resulting in cross-border reproductive care (Ferraretti et al. 2010; Rozée
Gomez and La Rochebrochard 2013; Vialle 2014; Präg and Mills 2017). Fur-
ther research on the demand for ART and its actual use today among “late
starters” or “late enlargers” is still needed.
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